CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira (Kenya)

GE.95-61732 (E).

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 707th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is a great honour for me to extend on behalf of all of us in the Conference a warm welcome to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, His Excellency Nursultan Nazarbayev, who will be addressing the plenary meeting today. We are indeed privileged to have with us today a leader who has contributed so much to the pursuit of our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, regional security and stability. It was under the wise and courageous leadership of President Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and took concrete steps in this regard through its adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, its ratification of START I and the subsequent dismantlement and removal of nuclear weapons from its territory. We are also aware of President Nazarbayev's untiring efforts in promoting the peaceful settlement of regional disputes and to bring about stability and security in his region.

I should also like to welcome, yet again, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Her Excellency Siri Bjerke. Her presence among us today demonstrates the importance her country attaches to our Conference and Norway's determination to make a meaningful contribution to our endeavours.

I also have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Canada, Australia and Egypt.

I now invite the President of Kazakhstan, His Excellency Nursultan Nazarbayev, to address the Conference.

Mr. NAZARBAYEV (Kazakhstan) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to greet the participants in this regular session of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and I am grateful for this opportunity to address you on behalf of my country.

I see it as highly symbolic that the acceptance of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an observer at the Conference on Disarmament virtually coincided with the destruction in Kazakhstan, at the former Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground, of the last nuclear device still left there after the closure. We didn't know what to do with it, and on 30 May this nuclear device was destroyed.

However, I would not like to limit my statement to a simple enumeration of the steps Kazakhstan has taken in the field of disarmament. They have been welcomed by the leading world Powers and international organizations and are well known to all participants in this session.

Thanks to these efforts, Kazakhstan has received guarantees of its security and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders from the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom. A document on this was signed on 5 December last year in Budapest and later on the People's Republic of China and France subscribed to it.

(Mr. Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan)

The purpose of my statement to you today is somewhat different. I would like to dwell on the topic of "new challenges and a new vision of the processes of disarmament and global security". Or, in other words, where does the process of worldwide disarmament and global security stand today, in the mid-1990s, and to what new challenges will we have to seek responses by the end of this century?

It is, I believe, quite clear that the goals of disarmament lie beyond the boundaries of the disarmament process. This is obvious. It is a bad thing when a gardener only looks after his flowers. If he does not watch the sky, thunder and hail will catch him unawares. Similarly, the criteria for the effectiveness of the disarmament process are set by society and by the mass of people outside the process - people in the sphere of creation, the sphere of development. The success of the disarmament process is measurable not only by the proportions by which we cut warheads and missiles, tanks and guns, but also by the extent to which life has been made better for ordinary people. Real security is not to be found where the quantity of armaments is decreased, but where more children are being born and where mothers, in giving them birth, have no fear for their future.

The success of the disarmament process is, first and foremost, linked to and defined by the effectiveness of the existing international security systems. Seven years ago, at the third special session on disarmament, in June 1988, it was noted that disarmament is not the exclusive responsibility of a few powerful countries, but the common endeavour of all States. And I would develop this idea in a broader context: the common endeavour of all States is to build an effective global system for international security and disarmament is one of the end results of the activity of this, so to speak, "global joint venture". And if we look at the disarmament process from that standpoint, we will see that even today there are several very serious problems on the horizon.

Problem number one. How effective are the existing international security systems and disarmament processes? If we judge the quality of international security by objective indicator of the world population's anxiety, the number of refugees, for example, then their total has increased several hundredfold over the past 10 years. Whereas in 1983 there were 9 countries in the world from which 50,000 people had fled, 10 years later there were 31 countries and the refugee count was in millions. As we can see, in a mere 10 years, the number of countries affected grew almost threefold.

So, in assessing the effectiveness of the disarmament process and international security, we have to have the courage to admit that in the past few decades the global conflict potential has grown significantly and is now much higher. Today it is becoming clear that this potential is not restricted merely to the traditional factors, to the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on whose reduction the emphasis has been over the past quarter of a century. It is no less obvious either that existing international security systems can hardly be considered effective if they do not stop the process of the escalation of tension.

(Mr. Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan)

The processes of disarmament and building of international security systems proved quite successful over the first 40 post-war years. However, as from the middle of the 1980s we started to witness entirely new global processes: the break-up of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and other trends not envisaged when the present international security systems were created. Today, it is becoming more and more obvious that the existing international security systems and the disarmament processes carried out within their framework need to be rethought and fundamentally improved.

The latest confirmation of this can be seen in the ever-more heated conflict in the Balkans. The fires are raging there despite all the efforts of the international security structures. This conflict has long since grown before our very eyes from a local to a regional one, and there are fears that in the very near future it may turn into a conflict on a continental scale. Quite clearly, conflicts of this kind should be quashed in their very earliest stages - at the regional level, and this should be done through effective regional security systems. Then the likelihood of a regional conflict escalating into a continental or global one as we are now seeing happen in the former Yugoslavia would be significantly reduced. It follows that the construction of international security systems and disarmament processes in order to address the known challenges of the 1980s and 1990s requires a new vision.

Problem number two. What will be the trends in the global conflict potential between now and the end of the century? The answer to this question can be found if we recognize that regional, continental and global international security systems and the disarmament processes within them generally arise on the basis of the economic and strategic interests of the States and groups of States taking part in them. History has taught us that international security systems have always been based on an understanding of the common interests of the participating States - first and foremost their economic interests, but their geoeconomic, geofinancial and geostrategic interests too. Hence, the trends in the global conflict potential up to the end of the century will to a significant extent be determined by the world geoeconomic trends of the late 1990s.

It has become clear over the past decade that the global geoeconomic trends are reflected in the formation of three new major economic centres - in North America, Western Europe and South East Asia. The coming century will probably see the awakening of Africa too. The final shaping of the contours of these three centres of global influence will probably be completed somewhere around the end of this century or the beginning of the next. It is quite obvious that this search for a new world balance of economic forces will inevitably lead to a search for a new global strategic balance, including in the sphere of security systems and the armament and disarmament processes within them.

If these trends grow, there is every reason to believe that the global conflict potential will also grow by the end of the century and so set us new challenges. This means that the "global joint venture" to build international security systems and develop disarmament must lose no time in mustering up all its strength to elaborate a new vision of the new challenges of the late 1990s.

(Mr. Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan)

Problem number three - the participation of third world countries in disarmament negotiations. It is widely recognized that all the major disarmament negotiations have so far been carried out between the major Powers of the East and West without the participation of third world representatives. How productive would such an approach be at the end of the 1990s?

I would like to dwell on security issues in Europe and Asia as being closest to my country, the Republic of Kazakhstan. We in Kazakhstan, in the centre of Eurasia, can see very well that there is a process under way in the West of building new international security systems based on both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the resources and structures of NATO. In the East and the South-East, Asian countries belonging to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) will apparently be seeking ways of achieving political and military interaction within their own structures.

It is not hard to see that there is a whole vertical row of countries in Eurasia, from Russia in the North to India in the South and including us, the central Asian States of the former Soviet Union, and Iran and Pakistan, which do not as yet belong to either the East or the West. I would call this continuous geopolitical belt of countries along the vertical meridian in the middle of Eurasia "the belt of uncertainty" or "the belt of anticipation". Despite their internal diversity, the countries in this "belt of uncertainty" comprise a relatively homogeneous group from the point of view of their potential to influence not just the balance of forces in Asia or Eurasia but also the global geopolitical balance. Security issues in Europe and especially in Asia and interaction between economic centres in Western Europe and South-East Asia will depend to a large degree on how these countries in the geopolitical "belt of uncertainty" define their positions and orientations. Undoubtedly the biggest and most powerful of these countries is Russia and it is Russia's choice that will largely determine the stability or changes in Eurasia.

In all, Russia has three options. The first is to join West European structures, but for the time being it is not being allowed in. The second is to join East Asian structures, but Russia is not expected there either. And the third is to unite the countries of the "belt of uncertainty", on the basis of equality for all, within a special group - a third security system on the Eurasian continent. The other Asian countries, including my own - the Central Asian countries within the "belt of uncertainty", have just two options: to turn to the East, or to build their own third security system and within it to resolve the issues of disarmament.

The problem of transforming the security and disarmament systems in Eurasia has, since the break-up of the USSR and the dissolution of this Warsaw Pact, taken on yet another aspect which did not exist before. The majority of the newly independent States of the former socialist bloc are today thinking first and foremost of creating their own national security resources. I would call this new factor "new autonomous security" for these countries. It is bound to be accompanied by an increase in armaments in them. It is quite natural to rely first on oneself, on one's own armed forces, and only afterwards on a security system and participation in the disarmament process.

(Mr. Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan)

Nor can we rule out the possibility that the disarmament process might be used by some of these countries as a means to modernize their own weapons.

This condition of "new autonomous security" presupposes a totally different pattern for the construction of international security systems. The practice of building such systems from the top down will not work here. Probably, in this case the more acceptable method will be gradual construction of one's own armed forces and then of a regional security system and finally accession to the existing continental or global international security systems and the respective disarmament processes. It follows from this that the new geopolitical situation also means a new role for developing countries, or third world countries, in disarmament processes and the building of international security systems. Present circumstances dictate that the United Nations and other international disarmament and security institutions should put more emphasis on sponsoring and creating first of all effective regional security systems and then on their basis we can transform existing continental international security systems or build new ones.

Study of security issues in the continent of Eurasia shows that third world countries, or developing countries, should be included on an equal footing in all disarmament negotiating processes. This would help to avoid the excessive ideologization of the disarmament process that is characteristic of the major Powers and it might also give rise to a new vision of the new challenges facing the international security and disarmament systems.

On the basis of its own views of the three international security and disarmament issues that I have mentioned, my country, the Republic of Kazakhstan, is participating purposefully and actively in all the processes of construction of security and disarmament systems at all levels of international cooperation in Eurasia. First of all there is our policy of integrating the efforts of three Central Asian States - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan - to maintain peace and stability in Central Asia. Second, there is Kazakhstan's active integrationist policy within the CIS where we have proposed a Eurasian union in the sphere of international security and disarmament. Third, there are Kazakhstan's initiatives in favour of the convening of a conference on interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia, which have been supported by the leadership of the United Nations. We have had several rounds of meetings this year, having set up a working party, and we are preparing for the convening of a conference of heads of external economic departments of almost 25 States in the Asian continent. This is a long-term effort to create modern security and cooperation structures within whose framework it will be possible with time to begin negotiations on disarmament on the Asian continent. Fourth, there is, as you know, Kazakhstan's participation in OSCE activities, in the Partnership for Peace programme, in the NPT, in START I and in the Disarmament Commission.

In all its practical foreign policy actions on international security and disarmament issues the Republic of Kazakhstan proceeds from two principles to which I have already alluded of the new vision: first, "from the comprehension of the new geoeconomic trends, through the improvement of existing international security systems and the construction of new ones, to the search for new approaches to disarmament"; second, "from the construction

(Mr. Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan)

of regional security systems, through the improvement and transformation of continental security systems, to the search for effective ways to improve the systems for global security". I believe that this kind of approach to the elaboration of a new vision of international security and disarmament will help us to find adequate responses to the new challenges at the end of this century and the beginning of the next. If these general issues are not resolved we shall always come up against barriers, surprises and insoluble problems when trying to address specific practical disarmament issues. I believe that the Conference on Disarmament cannot escape dealing with these issues, which life itself puts before us, and that it will with time find the proper answers to them.

I would like particularly to stress that the practical actions of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the sphere of international security and disarmament are aimed first and foremost at unconditional and full compliance with all the international treaties and agreements in this area that we have signed and to which we are a party. Our actions speak for us. We were, almost five years ago, the first of the CIS countries to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory. Kazakhstan was the first of the parties to the Lisbon Protocol to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State. By one of the first decrees of the first President of our State we closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground, one of the two largest in the world. The removal from the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan of more than 1,200 nuclear warheads for incontinental ballistic missiles was completed in April of last year. Now the soil of Kazakhstan is completely free of nuclear weapons. It is these practical steps by my country and our firm adherence to all the international agreements that have been concluded that allow us to raise the questions how and on what basis the search for new approaches to international security and disarmament can be carried out. It is this firm position of ours that gives me the grounds to put to ourselves and to you the questions that I have just raised.

I fully realize that the resolution of these three issues may go somewhat beyond the boundaries of the competence of the participants in this session and of the Conference on Disarmament in general, but it is precisely this clear realization that prompts me to address you in particular, for I am convinced that real success in the disarmament process depends first and foremost on the personal efforts, the rich experience and the talent of all those present in this hall, of all those who, metaphorically speaking, are the tireless "workers of the global joint venture for security and disarmament". I am also well aware that the raising of these three issues may go somewhat beyond the boundaries of the traditional views on modern disarmament processes, but it is by expanding the vision of disarmament issues in accordance with the new challenges, by stepping outside the traditional framework of understanding of disarmament, by searching for the foundations of a new vision that I have tried to bring out the purpose of my statement to you today.

The new situation born from the profound global changes of the 1980s and 1990s is confronting the Conference on Disarmament with new challenges. In order not to be left defenceless before these new challenges, in order to identify them properly, we must find a new vision of international security

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and disarmament issues. Hence, in these new conditions disarmament is armament with a new vision of the new challenges. I am sure that we will find the right answer.

We welcome the re-establishment within the Conference of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and we note with satisfaction the commencement of multilateral negotiations in this sphere. There are in Kazakhstan three modern seismograph stations left to us from the former Soviet Union that are capable of recording underground events thousands of kilometres away at any point on the globe. We propose that these stations be included in the global monitoring network, which could be an effective tool for monitoring nuclear explosions small and large. We call upon the nuclear Powers to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing until a test-ban treaty has been signed, and upon those who continue such testing to join the moratorium.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the President of Kazakhstan for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I shall now suspend this meeting for a few minutes in order for the Secretary-General of the Conference and myself to escort President Nazarbayev as he leaves the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 10.55 a.m.

Mrs. BJERKE (Norway): Mr. President, may I first of all congratulate you for your assumption of the presidency of the CD. I would also like to pay my respects to Secretary-General Vladimir Petrovsky and his deputy, Mr. Bensmail, and express our gratitude for the assistance they unfailingly provide members and observers to the CD.

This is the second time I have had the honour of addressing the Conference on Disarmament. When I spoke to you a year ago, I was able to express optimism with regard to global disarmament negotiations. And today I can see that we have indeed made progress. I am pleased that the CD will make an extra effort this year to advance work on the CTB Treaty. It is the hope of my Government that the Conference reach a positive outcome by the end of this year.

Our efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction are being exerted against the background of the very successful outcome of the NPT Conference in New York last month. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, now permanent, forms the most important element in the barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. An indefinite extension of the NPT, coupled with the parties' renewed commitments to nuclear disarmament and to a strengthened review process for the Treaty, sends a very strong signal to the ongoing negotiations in the CD. The commitment made by the parties to the NPT to prepare a CTBT at the latest by 1996 should also be made by the Conference on Disarmament. The NPT Conference brought a renewed pledge by the nuclear-weapon States to promote global reduction of nuclear arms, with the ultimate aim of eliminating these weapons. It is now your task to build on the achievements accomplished in New York.

(Mrs. Bjerke, Norway)

Regrettably, it did not prove possible to secure a final declaration from the NPT Conference on the review of the Treaty. However, many positive elements have emerged from the review exercise. New ground was charted in important areas relating to the supporting role which the IAEA is to play for the NPT. A strengthened role for the IAEA will support the objectiv of non-proliferation while reducing the risk factors generated by nuclear energy production and research. Agreement was also reached in two of the Main Committees on language concerning safe handling of military as well as civilian nuclear material.

The NPT Conference also provided a welcome impetus to further progress on the issue of security assurances. We believe this issue should continue to be pursued in the CD, with the active cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear weapons no longer have any military value. A policy of de fact no first use is emerging as a result of the transformation of the East-West relationship. The elimination of the most destabilizing nuclear weapon systems and the elimination of convention imbalances have contributed to this development. We would welcome further steps towards reducing the importance and relevance of nuclear weapons in the conduct of international affairs. Such a development should underpin and give substance to the formal assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States. In this respect, we would encourage nuclear-weapon States to exercise maximum transparency and openness with regard to their nuclear arsenals, unilaterally or through an appropriate international framework, as they pursue their nuclear disarmament efforts.

The completion of the CTBT remains the most important task for the CD in the immediate future. Work is progressing steadily, if not rapidly. There are many difficult items of substance to be resolved, some of them of a political nature. This is where we should now build in the momentum created by the NPT. Crucial political decisions, relating, for instance, to the scope of the treaty, could and should now be made without further delay. Once the basic parameters have been laid, the finer details of the treaty text will be easier to slot into place.

My country has been a partner of the CD for many years in the key area of verification of a CTBT. Much of the verification groundwork has been completed, thanks to the untiring efforts of Dr. Peter Marshal and Dr. Ola Dahlman and the GSE.

We note with satisfaction that the global test of a seismic CTBT monitoring system - GSETT-3 - was successfully put into full-scale operation on 1 January this year. Norway is participating in this test by providing data from some of the most advanced seismic array stations in the world. We are pleased to note the active role of Norwegian scientists in the planning and launch of GSETT-3. Furthermore, Norway is providing technical assistance to many countries in order to enable them to take part in this important experiment.

With the encouraging progress of GSETT-3, we consider that developing the seismic component of the future CTBT monitoring system is now well under way. It is now important to begin realistic testing of the other technologies envisaged for the monitoring system so that an operational system can be ready

(Mrs. Bjerke, Norway)

at the earliest possible time. We believe that the GSETT-3 system should be used as a framework for such tests, which must of course be carried out in such a way that they do not detract from the primary purpose of GSETT-3. The overall goal would be to develop and demonstrate the synergies of the different verification technologies in the eventual CTBT monitoring system.

The international verification system should be internationally funded, in order to ensure an equitable distribution of costs. International funding would avoid placing unreasonable economic burdens on countries whose participation is essential in order to provide adequate global coverage. It would facilitate the establishment of new seismic stations at appropriate locations. Furthermore, it would ensure that all stations and communication links could be operated to the required standards, and that the costs of operating the international system could be kept down, without sacrificing quality or efficiency. Perhaps most importantly, international funding is the best guarantee that the monitoring system will remain an effective deterrent against clandestine nuclear testing over the long term. Such financing will ensure that monitoring stations in all participating countries in the future can be maintained to the high standards required, without being dependent on available resources in each individual country.

I must use this opportunity to deplore the most recent nuclear test conducted by China on 15 May, shortly after the end of the NPT Conference which emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint in this regard. All nuclear-weapon States should refrain from further testing.

Once the draft CTBT has been completed, the next priority item on the CD's negotiating agenda should be the draft agreement banning production of weapons-grade fissile material. The NPT Conference brought us a new commitment to expedient negotiations on such a treaty. My delegation looks forward to future negotiations in the CD on a cut-off convention. Although the subject matter is complex, it is our hope that the CD will have the ability to cut through the complexities. The objective is simple, to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes as soon as possible. A universal treaty to this end should be within our grasp by the end of this century.

Norway is particularly concerned about the safe and controlled handling of fissile material that has been used for weapons purposes. As a consequence of nuclear disarmament, spent fissile material is now being released into a non-secure environment. Ways must be devised of accounting for existing stocks of fissile weapons materials within, or parallel to, the future international cut-off regime. In this context, I would like to compliment the United States Government for having decided to let the IAEA inspect a substantial stock of fissile material removed from dismantled nuclear weapons.

The Chemical Weapons Convention, a major triumph for the CD, has been signed by 159 States since it was opened for signature in January 1993. So far only 29 countries have ratified the Convention. This is well short of the 65 ratifications needed for the Convention to enter into force. My Government thinks the CWC is a most important instrument for ensuring regional

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as well as global stability. It outlaws a category of weapons of mass destruction that are relatively easy to acquire, but which can have devastating effects on civilian populations. We urge all countries that have not already done so to sign and ratify the CWC without delay.

Over the past three years a substantial effort has been made to clarify the possibilities of adding a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. We believe that this work has given favourable indications of the feasibility of verification measures that would strengthen the BWC. These efforts need to be pursued with a view to reaching a conclusion at the next Review Conference in 1996.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction takes on added importance with the restructuring of global security patterns. In the North, the arms build-up caused by the East-West conflict has been replaced by large-scale disarmament. But the excessive accumulation of armaments in the industrialized world in the past is not an example to be emulated by the countries now industrializing. Greater transparency in military matters and the systematic nurturing of confidence among States are key elements in bringing about a more stable, prosperous and better governed world community. Accumulation of conventional armaments can only trigger mutual suspicion and countermeasures. Rivalry involving the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction has a particular potency for edging regional stability out of control.

The CD has a potential role to play in alleviating such concerns. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms performs an important function in increasing international confidence in so far as member nations of the United Nations lend their full support. Obviously, much can still be done to improve the functioning of the Register. The item "Transparency in armaments", which is on the agenda of the CD, offers one opportunity to develop further the concept of greater international openness in the field of conventional armaments.

Today, we need to focus on the accumulation and use of conventional weapons. In numerous conflicts throughout the world, millions of civilians are the innocent victims of wars, fleeing their homes and countries to escape from the devastation caused by conventional arms.

The destruction and upheaval caused by conventional wars, however, do not affect the present situation only. The effects in terms of devastation of habitat, inter alia through the extensive use of mines, will affect many generations to come. An international regime to control the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines, with a view to the ultimate elimination of these weapons, would mean a great step forward, above all for the people of the developing world.

It is our firm believe that armed conflicts, internal as well as between States, must and can be avoided. We are daily being reminded of this imperative by news from the former Yugoslavia, from the former Soviet Union, or from the Middle East. Global arms reduction and control, and the banning of the most abhorrent and the most primitive of armaments would help people in

(Mrs. Bjerke, Norway)

all regions. But regional arms control agreements should also be encouraged. In areas where conflict looms, arrangements to curb the flow of arms to the parties can be the most important and effective preventive measure. UNIDIR has initiated an interesting study of disarmament and conflict resolution which may throw new light on the possibilities of using disarmament more actively as a tool for conflict prevention and management.

My country has actively followed the work of the Conference for more than a decade, having applied for membership in 1982. It remains a cause of deep frustration for us and for other observers that we are not able to fully take part in negotiations that are also important to our national interests, that we are not able to take a seat as equal partners in the negotiations on the CTBT, on cut-off and on the other items on your agenda.

There is now broad international agreement on the need for expansion. The General Assembly last year adopted a resolution on this issue. A broader partnership is now needed to advance the cause of disarmament internationally. An enlarged CD is necessary to widen the sense of ownership of disarmament treaties negotiated by the Conference. After all, the aim is to achieve universality for the legal instruments that will form the bulwark against weapons of mass destruction and the excesses of arms accumulation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Norway for her statement and for the kind words addressed to me.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, first of all, allow me to express the satisfaction of the Pakistan delegation for the skilful manner in which you have guided the work of this Conference over the past few weeks.

The presence of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan today in this conference is indeed an honour for this body. Pakistan enjoys close and friendly relations with Kazakhstan, where Prime Minister Bhutto was so warmly received by President Nazarbayev. We have listened with close attention to President Nazarbayev's statement and welcome the bold steps taken by Kazakhstan to promote nuclear disarmament and international security, both regional and global.

Mr. President, we also welcome the State Secretary of Norway amongst us and take note of her important statement.

I would also like to take this opportunity to formally welcome our new colleagues Ambassador Celso Lafer of Brazil, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico.

We have commenced this second part of the Conference on Disarmament's 1995 session with a sense of renewed expectation of progress towards genuine disarmament.

Since the first part of our session adjourned, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been extended indefinitely. While the NPT Conference was able to achieve this goal, the manner in which this decision was achieved and the failure of the Conference, for the third time, to adopt an agreed final

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

document reviewing the operation of the Treaty are indications of the fragility of the consensus upon which observance of the Treaty rests. Non-proliferation is, above all, a political objective which must be achieved through the political agreement of the States concerned. It will not be possible to achieve universal or indefinite respect for the Treaty by seeking alibis for some States while coercing others through discriminatory embargoes. Non-proliferation can be fostered by responding to the security concerns of all States; not by steps which exacerbate threats to their security and survival.

Pakistan believes that the NPT is a factor for international stability. We are glad that the Treaty has been extended. This does not imply that we can overlook the discriminatory character of the Treaty. And, in view of our security concerns which arise principally from threats within our region, Pakistan cannot accede to the NPT unilaterally.

The entire Pakistani nation is determined to resist and reverse the unilateral and discriminatory measures to which our country has been subjected for so many years. At the NPT Conference also, some of our friends sought to equate Pakistan's position with that of other countries which have consistently rejected the NPT and brought the spectre of nuclear weapons to their respective regions. Those delegates who pressed for reflection of such false equations in the documents of the Review Conference know full well that Pakistan has worked actively to promote global and regional non-proliferation, that we have actively supported initiatives and proposals made by their own country for non-proliferation measures in South Asia. These initiatives and proposals await determined and even-handed pursuit by its sponsor.

In this context, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference on Disarmament today to the impending threat posed by the planned production and imminent deployment of ballistic missiles against Pakistan. This fateful step, once taken, will transform an already tense situation in South Asia into a hair-trigger security environment. Pakistan will be obliged to take appropriate steps to respond to this new and qualitatively enhanced threat to its security.

It is essential, now that the NPT has been indefinitely extended, to reiterate that the purpose of non-proliferation and of the NPT is, above all, to facilitate realization of the ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament, in parallel with a process of conventional arms control. This fundamental premise of non-proliferation cannot be compromised by unilateral regimes which are designed to divide the world permanently into those who retain nuclear weapons and others who are prohibited from doing so. We ask that each of the nuclear Powers affirm during this session of the Conference that the indefinite extension of the NPT will not be construed by it as legitimising the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States.

Now, when the cold war is over, now when the doctrine of mutually assured destruction has, ostensibly, been thrown into the dustbin of history, realization of the goal of complete nuclear disarmament cannot be dismissed as an utopian dream. The five nuclear Powers do not need nuclear weapons to

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

preserve their security either against each other or against the non-nuclear-weapon States. Indeed, we must take advantage of the present window of opportunity, when there are no strategic confrontations between the major Powers to build urgent momentum to nuclear disarmament and the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons, analogous to the global prohibition of chemical weapons. In this context, we have noted with concern that the START II Treaty may not be quickly ratified by one or both parties; that the nuclear-weapon States, while quantitatively downsizing their nuclear arsenals, are qualitatively upgrading them; and that these States continue to resist concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this body.

The Pakistan delegation proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. This committee could commence its work with a review of the implementation of the START II agreement, and thereafter, outline the measures required to open negotiations among the five nuclear-weapon States on nuclear disarmament, with a view to adopting a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific time-frame.

For almost three decades, the comprehensive test-ban treaty has been viewed as an important instrument in the endeavour to promote nuclear disarmament as well as nuclear non-proliferation. We are not sanguine, however, that this long-standing consensus actually underpins the positions of some States in our negotiations on the CTBT within this Conference. Certain positions taken here by the nuclear-weapon States, asserting a right to continue to conduct nuclear tests on one pretext or another, even after having conducted hundreds and thousands of such tests, raises serious questions about their commitment to give up the continued development of nuclear weapons.

The CTBT should not be turned into another threshold test-ban treaty. Nor should it become merely another instrument against horizontal non-proliferation while allowing the nuclear-weapon States the means to continue nuclear weapons development. At a subsequent meeting, my delegation will present a more detailed analysis of the implications for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation inherent in the positions taken by the nuclear-weapon States on the scope of the CTBT.

In a similar way, the original aims of a ban on fissile materials production are in danger of being compromised. As originally proposed by Canada, and endorsed for years by the General Assembly, a fissile materials treaty was supposed to halt the production of fissile materials and gradually reduce stockpiles, thus serving the goals of both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. A simple cut-off will serve only to freeze the present unequal and, in some regions, dangerous status quo.

Today, the amount of fissile material held by the nuclear-weapon States is more than sufficient to build thousands of additional nuclear weapons. This could further accentuate the asymmetries in their nuclear arsenals. There are many other problems which will remain unanswered by a simple cut-off. All these issues require discussion and clarification as we commence efforts to negotiate a meaningful and universally acceptable fissile materials convention.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

In this context, I would like to express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada for the most commendable and fair manner in which he discharged his assignment as Special Coordinator on fissile material. Today, we wish to bid him farewell and to tell him that he will be missed in this Conference as it seeks to grapple with the difficult issue of fissile material.

The General Assembly has for almost 15 years recommended the conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of a binding international instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons States. After many years of sterile discussions, this issue was addressed earlier this year by the nuclear-weapon States in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Four of these States sponsored Security Council resolution 984 offering "positive" assurances of help against nuclear aggressions. It was perhaps no accident that agreement could not be reached within the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances.

Pakistan is concerned that these actions were undertaken outside this Conference, which has been mandated to conclude a binding international instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. It has been our consistent position that until comprehensive nuclear disarmament is achieved, the non-nuclear-weapon States are all entitled to receive credible assurances from the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Any linkage of security assurances to a State to accession to a particular Treaty, the NPT or any other, constitutes an erosion of the United Nations Charter, specifically of the principle upholding the sovereign equality of States and Article 51 investing each State with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, through or outside the United Nations Security Council.

The Pakistan delegation urges the immediate revival of the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances to resume consideration of an international and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

The resistance to the Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances was justified at an earlier part of our session by the response within the Group of 21 to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Pakistan is not opposed to the creation of this Ad Hoc Committee. We believe, however, that the supply-side approach, reflected by the nomenclature of this Committee, is unlikely to promote the goals of conventional arms control and international stability. One-sided control on the transfer of arms cannot redress the imbalance within sensitive regions of the world. Discriminatory embargoes have in many cases enhanced the threat to peace, accentuated the danger of proliferation and frustrated initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation. Conventional arms control must address the root causes of insecurity, emanating from disputes, conflicts and threat perceptions. Conventional arms control must seek to promote balance and security among all the regional States concerned. My delegation will avail itself of an early opportunity to make a detailed presentation on a possible approach to Conventional arms control which we hope will be actively pursued by this Conference.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

The Pakistan delegation will also shortly submit for the consideration of the Conference more detailed views and suggestions with regard to some of the other items on our agenda. Meanwhile, it is our view that this Conference should expeditiously establish ad hoc committees to pursue concrete negotiations on all its agenda items, which should be treated on the basis of equity and non-discrimination.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

I should now like to take the opportunity of extending a warm welcome to the newly-appointed representative of Turkey, Ambassador Uluçevik, who is with us for the first time today and I invite him to take the floor.

Mr. ULUÇEVIK (Turkey): Mr. President, at the outset, please allow me to express on behalf of my delegation my appreciation for the outstanding leadership you have displayed in the conduct of the work of the Conference. May I also thank you for the warm words of welcome that you have just kindly addressed to me.

As I today make my first appearance before this important body, I pledge my personal cooperation with all my colleagues as well as with our distinguished Secretary-General, Mr. Petrovsky, and his staff in the pursuit and achievement of lofty disarmament goals. I assure them that my delegation will continue to support every effort that this Conference will make with the aim of creating a safer world.

May I also say how proud I am at the fact that my first intervention in the Conference on Disarmament coincided with the important address of H.E. Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of brotherly Kazakhstan.

Like all the other States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Turkey attached great importance to a successful outcome of its Review and Extension Conference and tried to contribute to its work to that end. The result that we have all obtained in the extension part of the Conference matches Turkey's expectations, which can be shortly defined as obtaining progress in the consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and strengthening hopes for nuclear disarmament.

In fact, the indefinite extension decision emerged without a vote because all the Parties wanted the same result, that is the strongest possible NPT regime. This decision deserves the world's appreciation for approving a permanent constraint on nuclear multiplication. The main objectives of the treaty with regard to strengthening the non-proliferation regime will indeed be better achieved through the permanent NPT. At the same time, we are convinced that the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament will depend on the effective implementation of the Treaty and on full compliance with its provisions.

(Mr. Uluçevik, Turkey)

Another important outcome of the Conference, in conjunction with the extension decision, was the adoption, again without a vote, of the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty.

The Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament provide that nuclear disarmament as set out in the NPT should be fulfilled with determination. By adopting this decision, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. Moreover they also pledged to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arms. In this context, this decision calls for the completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as for the immediate initiation and early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The section on the safeguards issue of the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is of crucial importance for Turkey. I am sure it will be recalled that my country was among the first to stress the need for an effective verification mechanism for the NPT. We, therefore, welcome the fact that the Conference has called for the promotion of transparency in nuclear-related export controls. States should, through vigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear material.

In this regard, we believe that safeguards foreseen in article III of the NPT are designed for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of obligations undertaken by the States Parties to the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In short, we fully support the approach concerning the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system contained in the text of the Principles and objectives decision. We would no doubt have found it even more satisfactory if the elements which were agreed upon in Main Committee II of the Conference on greater access for the IAEA to relevant information and greater physical access to relevant sites as envisaged by the 93 + 2 Programme had been included in the text of the decision.

The decision adopted on strengthening the review process for the Treaty is also welcomed by Turkey. My country will be following the preparatory process and the Review Conferences attentively and will make constructive contributions.

We note with elation that following the cold-war era, concrete and significant progress has been made in the field of disarmament. Yet, at the same time, we are aware of the fact that important tasks still lie ahead of us.

In this context we consider the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as an historic event. We believe this Conference will have positive impacts on

(Mr. Uluçevik, Turkey)

efforts towards attaining the universality of the NPT. We therefore wish to call once again on those remaining States not Parties to the Treaty to accede to the indefinitely extended NPT, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Turkey for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TARMIDZI (Indonesia): Mr. President, at the outset, please allow me to express the satisfaction of the Indonesian delegation at seeing you, the representative of Kenya - a country with which Indonesia enjoys excellent relations - chairing the plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament. Indeed it cannot be more fitting that a seasoned diplomat of your calibre should be presiding over our deliberations at this important juncture of the Conference's work in which some pending issues need to be resolved. At the same time, I should also like to state that I am very grateful for the words of welcome you offered to me during the last plenary session. In fact, it was not the first time I was welcomed in this august body, since I also served as head of the Indonesia delegation to the CD from 1987 to 1988. Likewise, my gratitude also goes to your predecessors, Ambassador Vattani of Italy and Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, for the excellent manner with which they conducted our previous deliberations. May I also use this opportunity to warmly welcome the newly-appointed Ambassadors of Brazil, Finland, Mexico and Turkey whose wisdom, in my view, will greatly contribute to the attainment of the Conference's objectives.

I should also like to say how privileged I am to speak in this plenary after listening to the inspiring key-note address from the President of Kazakhstan, the contents of which I consider to be of paramount importance in guiding the Conference to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the international community.

My delegation is also inspired by the statement made by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway.

I could not agree more with the points raised by some speakers who have spoken during the previous plenary and even today to the effect that this second part of the CD annual session will undoubtedly be illuminated by the results of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference during which the State Parties to the Treaty reached decisions on several issues such as the indefinite extension of the NPT, the strengthening of the review mechanism, the establishment of a weapons of mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East and on the objectives and principles to be pursued by the States Parties. There are at least three points which need to be highlighted as far as the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference is concerned. Firstly, the States Parties were in the end unfortunately unable to reach a consensus decision on the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Secondly, the States Parties were also unable to produce any final document at the end of the Conference and thirdly, the decisions taken by the Conference constituted a package. In other words, no decision on the indefinite extension of the NPT

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

would have been possible had the two opposing sides failed to agree that the decision on extension be linked to the other three decisions to which I have referred earlier on.

The failure of the 1995 NPT Conference to command consensus on the extension issue and on the final declaration was too important a phenomenon to be ignored. For it sends a crystal-clear signal to the international community that the NPT remains a most controversial international legal regime, over which the States Parties are still divided when it comes to assessing its implementation. As we are all aware, some of its members consider that they have fully implemented the Treaty, while the majority of member States feel that much remains to be done, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament, before it can be said that the States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States have fully adhered to and complied with the provisions contained therein. One might argue that the failure to produce a final document is not new in the history of the Treaty and hence that it bears no significance for the credibility of the NPT. We do not share this view, for, this time, these occurrences have happened at the most critical juncture of the Treaty's lifespan, during which the review and decision-making processes should have been smoothly carried out if the NPT was to contain no fundamental shortcomings in its implementation. Hence, my delegation considers that the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely was unfortunately somewhat hollow.

It will therefore be no secret if I say that Indonesia was not altogether happy with the results of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. For, judging from the proceedings we have painstakingly gone through, my delegation has come to the conclusion that the States Parties, especially those possessing nuclear weapons, are less committed than previously to achieving one of the overriding objectives of the NPT, which is nuclear disarmament. Even more worrisome, there was some strong opposition demonstrated by the nuclear-weapon States as to their commitment to engage in a full-fledged negotiation on an international legally binding and multilaterally negotiated regime to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which was considered to be one of the main sticking points preventing the Conference from producing a consensus final declaration. One cannot also avoid the impression that much emphasis was put on the extension issue and the non-proliferation aspect of the Treaty, thereby setting aside the nuclear disarmament issue to which non-nuclear-weapon States attach much greater importance in this post cold-war era.

While fully agreeing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, poses serious threats to international peace and security, my delegation continues to believe that nuclear disarmament is still the highest priority on our agenda. For the continued existence of these horrendous weapons will inevitably invite proliferation. In our view, therefore, nuclear disarmament is the sole cure to proliferation and the sooner we achieve it the better. The seeming lack of seriousness and political will from some quarters to pursue negotiations in good faith in this field will undoubtedly lessen the credibility of the NPT, as well as the confidence of the States Parties in the Treaty. My delegation will continuously assess the performance of the Treaty in order to evaluate

(Mr. Tarmidzi, Indonesia)

what proper steps are to be taken should some States Parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, not be able to fully abide by, and faithfully adhere to, the commitments assumed under the NPT. To start with, the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to submit to the collective wisdom of the CD in establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances will be the first case in point. After adopting by consensus in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference the objectives and principles to be pursued by the NPT States Parties, my delegation sees no obstacles whatsoever to the establishment of this Committee and therefore hopes that those States will not stand in the way of achieving this consensus. Furthermore, this should be followed by the establishment of another subsidiary body on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to which the Group of 21 also attaches great importance.

Unfortunately, over-emphasis on the non-proliferation aspect of weapons of mass destruction has also been apparent in the CD, especially if we candidly evaluate the conduct of negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty and cut-off treaty. On CTBT there is a strong wish on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to formulate the scope of the treaty, which would only be comprehensive for those states which have not yet tested these weapons, while still opening the possibility for the possessing States to continue testing, using sophisticated techniques which cannot be banned by the treaty. The same case also applies to the cut-off treaty, on which there are some tendencies to narrowly interpret the report prepared by Ambassador Shannon of Canada, the Special Coordinator on this issue, thereby nullifying the need to also discuss the existing stockpiles.

In this context, my delegation wishes to remind the members of the CD not to lose sight of the fact that the name of the Conference clearly spells out the objectives which we shall be striving to achieve, namely to conclude a series of legal disarmament agreements, especially those regulating weapons of mass destruction. Failure to do so will pose a serious challenge to the raison d'être of the CD. It would entail changing its name to the "Conference on Non-Proliferation", which my delegation believes none of us here present would readily agree to do.

Let me conclude on a positive note by saying that my delegation stands ready to engage in any positive dialogue in an attempt to safeguard the reputation of this Conference as the sole multilateral negotiating body dealing with disarmament, upon which the international community has placed high expectations. Accordingly, we will do our utmost to help ensure that the real objectives of the Conference are never lost from sight and stay within our reach, including the conclusion of the CTBT not later than 1996.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Before giving Ambassador Shannon the floor, I wish to express on behalf of the Conference, as well as on my own behalf, our regret at his impending departure from Geneva after an impressive tour of duty. I am sure we will all remember with gratitude Ambassador Shannon's contribution to the work of our Conference, in particular as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of

(The President)

an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1990. More recently, he was instrumental in bringing about a successful conclusion to the difficult and protracted consultations which resulted in agreement on a mandate for the negotiation of a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes or other nuclear explosive devices. Ambassador Shannon's commitment and integrity will be greatly missed. I am sure you all join me in wishing Ambassador Shannon and his family every happiness for the future.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, thank you very much for those kind words you directed to me. I do appreciate them greatly. As this is the first time I have had the opportunity to address plenary since you assumed the presidency I would like in return to congratulate you on your assumption of this office and on your efficient and effective handling of our deliberations, particularly during some difficult discussions in the final week of the first part of the Conference in April.

As I take my leave of the Conference on Disarmament, I trust you will permit me to make some personal reflections. The Conference is a very different place today than it was when I attended my first plenary in 1990. In fact, if memory serves me right, I think I sat in this chair when I first arrived. When I look back over the past five and a half years, three events in the world of disarmament loom large: one which took place within the walls of this impressive chamber, and two others which took place outside. As to the first, I am referring of course to the conclusion in 1992 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which took far too long to negotiate, but which should lead to the elimination of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The other two events of pre-eminent importance to our work here were the end of the cold war and the recent decision in New York to extend indefinitely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The end of the cold war was astounding because of the swiftness with which it occurred once the tidal wave of change had begun to roll. I want to return later in these remarks to the direct consequences this event has for the working of this body. Initially, however, I would like to focus on the implications, in particular for the work of the CD, and other disarmament forums, of the indefinite extension of the NPT.

Since its entry into force 25 years ago, the NPT has been a cornerstone of Canadian security policy. What then are the implications of the indefinite extension for Canada, as a non-nuclear-weapon State? The single most important gain for Canada is that the Treaty is now permanent - not a collection of temporary and uncertain provisions we would revisit from time to time. At the same time, we have embedded in the Treaty accountability. This is an achievement of historic proportions in our view. The principal challenge now facing the Treaty is to push its near-global membership all the way to universal adherence.

As a result of the decisions taken in New York, States Parties to the NPT, including the nuclear-weapon States, are committed to a strengthened review process. This process will begin with Preparatory Commissions in 1997, 1998 and 1999 before the next formal review in the year 2000. This new

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

commitment means an accelerated and more frequent review of accountability, the goal of which is to accelerate nuclear disarmament and prevent non-proliferation.

One of the significant achievements in the NPT Declaration of Principles was the adoption of a programme of action which requires the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons. This is a very welcome commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to a more concrete and structured engagement in nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the programme of action clearly commits all States Parties to the completion of the CTBT negotiations no later than 1996. We have long had the CTBT as a shared objective. But now we have all accepted that the negotiations will have a finite end. We must ensure that commitment is respected. The programme of action also commits us firmly to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a cut-off treaty in accordance with my statement to the CD of 23 March of this year and the mandate contained therein.

We have already made solid progress in the negotiation of the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Much fruitful work has been done on the development of the international monitoring system. Further refinement is needed. Important decisions remain in the areas of organization, entry into force, scope, duration and withdrawal. These decisions must be made before the end of this year. Otherwise, our solemn commitment in New York will be in jeopardy.

It is the duty of all members of the CD to create the most favourable conditions possible for the successful conclusion of the CTBT negotiations. In that context, I must say that the regrettable decision of the People's Republic of China to proceed with an underground nuclear test at Lop Nor on 15 May is in no way consistent with this duty. We have heard the assertion of the Chinese Government that China has conducted relatively few tests compared with the other nuclear-weapon States. But how can nuclear testing, at the very time we are striving so hard to deliver what we have promised to the world, be reconciled with the "utmost restraint" in principle 4 (a) of the NPT declaration of principles? All the nuclear-weapon States are committed by their obligation to utmost restraint. They must behave responsibly if they are to meet that obligation.

Mr. President, I have, as you know, and as you have pointed out, a special interest in the progress of the negotiation of a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. I have appreciated the opportunity given to me by the Conference to have had a direct involvement in our collective achievements to date. I have throughout my consultations and work as Special Coordinator appreciated the support and the assistance of delegations, both members and non-members. Last month in New York, States Parties to the NPT recognized the urgency of the need for a cut-off treaty in their adoption of the declaration of principles. I urge delegations to redouble efforts towards a cut-off treaty. Is there any reason why we should not conclude it as quickly as possible having secured the CTBT?

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

There obviously is work to be done in other areas as well. The security assurances offered by the five nuclear-weapon States at the closing plenary of the Conference on 6 April were welcome. But they were unilateral in nature, and, accordingly, subject to unilateral change. While Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 added to the formality of the commitment undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States, it did not meet the hopes of many States Parties to the NPT, who seek binding commitments. I note with satisfaction that the declaration of principles calls for further steps to provide assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, we must continue to examine the functioning and effectiveness of this Conference. The cold war has ended. But is the Conference on Disarmament equipped for the job that lies ahead? Can it respond effectively to the changing needs of its members? Speaking personally, I am persuaded that a long hard look needs to be taken at some CD traditions, starting with the geographic group structure. While serving some purposes, the structure often prevents a real dialogue on important issues. It masks proponents and opponents, so that debate too often takes place in the dark. While perhaps a calming device during the cold war, the mechanism of presidential consultations - now the only formal forum for exchanges between groups - is artificial and unproductive.

I hasten to say that this is no reflection on past or present incumbents of the presidency. At some time or another, we all have served or will serve there. The group system is something we all inherited from a bygone era. Let us free ourselves from this relic of the past. Let us deal with our differences openly and directly.

I became most aware of the inadequacies of the group structure during the consultations on cut-off. But I also discovered some possible ways forward. For example, on three occasions, I convened members outside traditional groups. I think that participants found these meetings productive and useful to the work of the Conference as a whole. Certainly those are the comments that I have heard. I pay tribute to the participants who willingly engaged in that exercise with the results we were able to achieve.

In the NPT context, Canada has also convened meetings of non-traditional groupings, which again was a process welcomed by many and which produced solid results. These experiences indicated to me that we should all be receptive to new approaches, both procedurally and substantively, if the Conference is to remain relevant, effective and at the forefront of efforts to deal with the most pressing issues of international security.

I wish also to express our continuing and profound regret that our Conference has been unable to reach consensus on a list of countries to be added to its very limited membership; once reached, such agreement will make the Conference on Disarmament a more credible body as we move to finalize the important negotiations under way and embark on new ones. It will reflect more closely the disarmament environment at the end of this millennium. We

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

continue to believe that exclusivity can no longer be justified. We continue to support the principle of including all States who formally apply to join by a certain cut-off date and in accordance with established procedure.

There are other questions we need to ask. Is the consensus rule still useful, especially in the context of an expanded CD? In most negotiating environments, consensus is the practice but States refrain from tying their hands by making it a rule.

I do not wish the CD to be diverted from the important work under way on CTBT or on cut-off by a dissection of our constitution and the rules and practices under which we operate. But let us re-examine why we do things the way we do. It is not good enough simply to say that that is the way we have always done things. Rules and procedures are tools, not objects in themselves. If they help our work, let us keep them. If they get in the way, let us throw them out.

Colleagues, I wish to end by thanking you all for your support and your encouragement throughout my tenure in the CD, and particularly in the last 16 months as Special Coordinator. I wish you all well in the work that lies ahead.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to me.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, I would like to this opportunity to congratulate you formally, and on behalf of my delegation, I would also like to thank you for your untiring work to further the objectives of this Conference. Allow me also to welcome newly-arrived ambassadors and to express my deep regret at Ambassador Shannon's departure and to pay tribute to his sustained and skilful efforts to establish negotiations on cut-off.

On 9 February of this year I set before the Conference the elements of Australia's approach to the comprehensive test-ban treaty negotiations for 1995. As we approach the mid-point of our 1995 negotiating session, it is time for us to take stock.

The political environment in which we are working has changed markedly since the first part of our 1995 session closed on 7 April, with the series of decisions reached on 11 May amongst the 175 States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that participated in the Review and Extension Conference.

On that occasion the overwhelming majority of the international community - and all five of the nuclear-weapon States - unambiguously confirmed and renewed their commitment to the achievement of the vision set out in the Treaty of a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, nuclear non-proliferation was cemented in place as the standard for acceptable international behaviour in perpetuity. These historic achievements have positive implications for our work in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

There should be impact on the pace and effectiveness of the CTBT negotiations. For the first time, the five nuclear-weapon States have joined in agreeing a programme of action for nuclear disarmament which includes as its first substantive point "... the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996". The use of the word "programme" was deliberate. We are not speaking of mere hopes or aspirations, of things which might or might not come to pass. We are speaking of commitment to concrete steps.

The choice of the words "no later than 1996" was also deliberate. Our collective aim is to conclude the CTBT literally as soon as possible, with a firm implicit warning from the overwhelming majority of the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States, that 1996 is the latest to which conclusion can be allowed to slide.

In speaking of the CTBT I need to underline the importance to our collective endeavour of an atmosphere conducive to rapid progress and of a mutual trust as to our commitment to the objective. I have to reiterate in that context the very grave concern with which my Government views continued Chinese nuclear testing, including the latest test, conducted in the immediate aftermath of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. This act violated not only the positive spirit, but also the non-proliferation norm so clearly reaffirmed at the NPT Conference.

Australia is absolutely opposed to nuclear testing. Continued testing at a time when all other nuclear-weapon States are indeed demonstrating utmost restraint as called for in the NPT statement of principles and objectives cannot be readily reconciled with national positions of support for nuclear disarmament.

Turning to important aspects of the CTBT negotiating process, I would suggest that, if we are to be seen as serious in our intent to close as soon as possible and certainly no later than 1996, it is abundantly clear that we must have consensus before too much longer on what it is that we are seeking to ban, i.e. there must be agreement on the question of scope. Further long delay will court ridicule and unambiguously indicate lack of commitment to our objective.

My delegation believes closure on scope is eminently achievable.

We believe the negotiating Committee is beginning to see a plainly perceptible movement towards convergence. At the end of the last part of the 1995 session, I was pleased to note the wide in-principle support for the concept of a simple and clear-cut article on the scope of the treaty along the lines advanced by Australia in CD/NTB/WP.222 of 9 March 1995. We were gratified when first the United States and then the United Kingdom declared their support for this formulation.

On a related aspect, the review portion of the NPT Conference saw the recording of some important views bearing on the proposal that so-called peaceful nuclear explosions be exempted from the bans implemented under the

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

CTBT. In a conference which to a great extent comprised the wider international community on whose behalf we are negotiating the CTBT, consensus was reached on the following language:

> "The potential benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated and that serious concerns have been expressed on the environmental consequences that could result from the release of radioactivity from such applications and on the risk of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, no requests for services related to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have been received by the IAEA since the Treaty entered into force. The Conference further notes that no State Party has an active programme for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. The Conference therefore recommends that the Conference on Disarmament takes this situation and future developments into account when negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty."

Notwithstanding the fact that a final declaration on the review did not emerge from the Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, the accepted language makes clear the lack of international support for making a special case to exclude peaceful nuclear explosions from the prohibition on testing.

I do not propose to repeat my remarks of 9 February on the sorts of ideas that emerged from the differences of opinion within this Conference which, in Australia's judgement would make consensus on scope impossible. I urge delegations, however, to reflect carefully before continuing to promote at this more definitive stage of the negotiations ideas which would either overextend or undermine the concept of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

My delegation recognizes the particular interest of the nuclear-weapon States in the issue of scope. Recognition of this specific interest is, of course, linked to these States themselves accepting a particular responsibility for agreeing on an approach to scope capable of gaining broad acceptance.

I put the view firmly that the need for such an agreement between nuclear-weapon States is becoming increasingly urgent and that these States should make a major effort over the course of the coming summer months to nail down scope issues. Unless this is achieved and the Conference is able to reach prompt agreement on scope, we will not reach a conclusion in line with our commitments.

I would suggest that the nuclear-weapon States re-examine their positions on scope in light of the new reality created by the indefinite extension of the NPT. The world is a more secure place as a result of the principled and courageous decision made by 170 non-nuclear-weapon States participating in the Conference. Those States now look for a contribution in a similar spirit to the elaboration of arrangements to secure the scope of a CTBT which powerfully reinforces the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and the now entrenched nuclear non-proliferation norm.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

With regard to ongoing work in the present part of the 1995 session, my delegation sees the work of the verification working group as a central focus. In the four remaining weeks of this part of the session, it is quite possible, and it is important for the strategic course of the negotiations, that we make a series of decisions relating to the international monitoring system (IMS) and on-site inspection (OSI). While text-cleaning work is necessary, the real progress we need will flow from decision-making in the working group itself. We wholeheartedly support Ambassador Norberg's intention that the group confront key questions as its central priority.

On IMS, as a result of textual and experts' work over previous months, we have before us in the rolling text a series of options for decision on the architecture of the IMS, including the numbers and combinations of monitoring stations to be included in the various global networks; on funding; and on the degree to which IMS-derived data is processed by the central Organization.

These issues are complex. But the options, their implications, and the positions currently adopted on them by delegations are sufficiently clear. If we are serious about progress on the treaty, it is incumbent upon us to move from restatement of positions to the less comfortable but more practical business of achieving convergence and negotiating agreed outcomes.

Likewise, on on-site inspections the work of the three convenors has highlighted a cluster of interrelated issues on which the working group needs to narrow differences further, issues such as: the possible role of a consultation and clarification procedure; the origins and basis of an OSI request; the possible role of technical evaluation after an inspection request; whether OSI is to be conceptually a single or a multi-phased operation; and how an OSI is to be triggered ("red" or "green-light" procedure and majority required). The Group now needs to find a way of exploring and developing a packaged conceptual approach in order to progress the textual work. Then delegations might find it easier to concede points which are currently protected in the rolling text but which are incompatible with a consensus outcome.

In both IMS and OSI discussions in the verification working group, it will be helpful if delegations are consistently represented at levels appropriate to their declared intention of striking agreements and encouraging rapid progress.

As is obvious from my remarks on scope, we do not suggest that we relax on legal and institutional issues. In particular my delegation agrees with those who see the treaty's provisions on the future CTBT Organization as being a promising focus of work. A number of organizational provisions - including those dealing with the seat of the Organization and with its functional relationship with the IAEA - are in our view ripe for convergence.

To conclude I wish to say that we have been encouraged by the business-like resumption of activity in this second part of the session. The quite complex, but flexible and focused structure of working and drafting groups developed in the first part of the session has got us off to a fair start. I would particularly like to record our appreciation for the work of

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

the Chairmen and other office holders, as well as the efforts of supportive delegations which have given purpose to this structure. I have to note, however, that, while structure and activity are important, it is the achievement of convergence and agreed outcomes that are decisive. Our collective ability to manage this process over the next four weeks and beyond will be eloquent demonstration, I might say in one direction or the other, of our commitment and determination to see results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I wish to begin by congratulating you on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you every success in your task, particularly as you are a permanent representative of a sister African country which is a member of the Group of 21. I would also like to welcome other new colleagues who have joined us recently, namely, the Ambassadors of Indonesia, Brazil, Finland and Turkey, and I express my thanks and appreciation to His Excellency Ambassador Shannon of Canada for his initiatives and valuable contributions to the work of the CD, the most recent of which were his tireless efforts to reach a consensus on his report as Special Coordinator on the banning of the production of fissile materials, which was approved by the Conference during the first part of its session. His report actually constitutes the mandate of the ad hoc committee dealing with this issue.

The statement made before the Conference by His Excellency the President of Kazakhstan this morning is undoubtedly an important contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and it will be of benefit to us during our forthcoming deliberations.

Only a few weeks ago the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference came to a close in New York. While some are satisfied with the outcome of the Conference, as it succeeded in adopting three decisions and particularly the extension decision and a resolution on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, others are not satisfied with the outcome of the Conference as it failed to adopt a final declaration in its review process. During the preparatory stage for the Conference we had insisted that the review should be conducted first and that the Conference should consider the decision on extension later on. Egypt viewed the Conference as a rare opportunity to take decisive action to ensure a world free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats including at the regional level. Regrettably that opportunity was not seized and the post-conference disarmament scene is no different from the pre-conference one, except for the fact that today five recognized nuclear Powers have an absolute right to maintain that status for as long as any of them sees fit, while the other States which have voluntarily rejected the nuclear option are left without any effective and legally binding protection in the event of aggression or threat of aggression by the five declared nuclear Powers or the non-declared nuclear States which have not acceded to the Treaty. I am referring in particular to the situation in the Middle East. This situation is most unfortunate and is far from being compatible with the spirit and letter of the NPT. It leaves article VI not fully implemented 25 years after the Treaty's entry into force.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

In the field of security assurances we welcome the fact that the consensus decision on principles and objectives, which was adopted without a vote, recognizes the fact that steps taken so far in this field are not sufficient. The decision provides that "further steps should be considered to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Since there is also full agreement that these steps, and I quote from the same decision, "could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument", as has been requested time and again by the Group of 21, the Conference on Disarmament should no longer delay the re-establishment of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee, which should promptly initiate negotiations on such an instrument. In this context it is important to point out that at the NPT Conference an overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States merely took note of, but did not welcome either Security Council resolution 984 or the unilateral declarations made by the five nuclear-weapon States in March and April 1995.

Since deadlock continues to prevent the Conference on Disarmament from achieving any progress on the issue of transparency in armaments, the delegation of Egypt would like to make a few observations. Egypt has always advocated and continues to advocate full transparency in armaments. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA in the previous sessions referred not only to conventional weapons but also in clear and unambiguous terms to weapons of mass destruction and I invite the distinguished members to read carefully General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, which was the basis for the mandate of this Committee. The NPT Review and Extension Conference decision 2 on principles and objectives referred in its operative paragraph 4 (c) to, "The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons", namely nuclear weapons, and by efforts "by all States" to achieve "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". This objective cannot be achieved without full transparency in the nuclear field and the registration of any reduction in the nuclear stockpiles as compared with the stockpiles which were declared at the beginning. Hence the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA should be clear with respect to the nuclear field, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, in addition to conventional weapons, since the said resolution calls for the establishment of a register of seven categories of conventional weapons to which should be added the stockpiles and national production and advanced technology with military applications. All members of the Conference on Disarmament should implement such a mandate fully without selectivity if they are seeking, in good faith, to make progress on this agenda item.

Since the General Assembly session in 1974, Egypt has been striving for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Our early adherence to the NPT and the numerous Egyptian initiatives in this regard are ample testimony to this fact. One obstacle, however, is preventing the achievement of this objective in the region. Israel is the only country in the Middle East which possesses nuclear facilities which it refuses to subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards. It also refuses to adhere to the NPT within a specific timeframe. No other country in the Middle East is in such a situation. This situation does not augur well for the future, particularly in view of the many difficulties and challenges that have to be overcome in the

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Middle East peace process. We regard the establishment of such a zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction as a confidence-building measure which is likely to speed up the peace process and provide the necessary guarantees to attain this objective. It is unacceptable that the countries which have clearly rejected the nuclear option should be driven towards regretting their decision and concluding that they were misled and that their adherence to the NPT has not actually served their security interests. We therefore from this rostrum urge a follow-up to the Middle East resolution adopted by the NPT Conference on 11 May 1995 and we hope that all States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will indeed, and I quote, "exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems". This resolution generally reflects the initiative taken by President Hosni Mubarak, concerning the establishment of this zone, in April 1990.

In keeping with what I have just said, please allow me now to briefly remind the Conference on Disarmament of the basic provisions of the principles and objectives decision adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference which have a special bearing on the situation in the Middle East and on the establishment of this nuclear-weapon-free zone. These provisions must be implemented and their implementation should be monitored, using the improved monitoring system, with effect from the year 1997. Firstly, paragraph 1 of the principles and objectives decision notes that "Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority". In the context of the Middle East this paragraph refers to Israel as it is the only country to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the region. Secondly, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the same decision deal with the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and note that their development "especially in regions of tension such as in the Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged as a matter of priority", etc. There are many other relevant passages which I will not refer to here. We can only hope that the consensus that apparently exists on the principles and objectives will lead to concrete steps and actions. Egypt for its part will continue to exert every effort to ensure that this happens.

Finally, I wish to express our disappointment as far as the deliberations of the last session of the Disarmament Commission in May 1995 are concerned. These meetings took place immediately after the conclusion of the NPT Review Conference. Those who supported an indefinite extension of the NPT on the grounds that it would give an impetus to nuclear disarmament were proved wrong on this first occasion after the conclusion of the NPT Conference. We regret in particular the poor performance in the Disarmament Commission on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

The coming months here at the Conference on Disarmament will show whether or not we can build on the results of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Our work in the Conference on Disarmament should be forward-looking and we should seek to implement in good faith all the relevant commitments adopted at the 1995 NPT Conference. The Egyptian delegation has the intention to cooperate with others to achieve the ultimate objective of

(Mr. Sha, China)

On the matter of nuclear testing, China has always exercised the utmost restraint, an attitude that has never changed in response to a particular time or event. Although in the history of its nuclear testing it has on many occasions applied a de facto moratorium, we have our own views on moratoriums and have therefore never declared one. Compared to the major nuclear Powers with the largest, most advanced nuclear arsenals, which have conducted thousands of tests, China's testing has been extremely limited and restrained. China has played a positive and serious part in the CTBT negotiations and given repeated undertakings that, once the treaty takes effect, it will abide by it and desist from testing. As always, it will work alongside the other members of the CD for the early conclusion of a good CTBT.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It is so decided.

I had hoped to be able to announce progress in our consultations regarding pending issues. However, it appears that more time is needed to overcome existing differences of views. I am sure that my successor, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, will spare no efforts to bring these consultations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

May I now make some closing remarks as we come to the end of Kenya's presidency of this Conference? Distinguished delegates and dear colleagues, it has been a great honour for my country, and for me personally, to preside over the Conference on Disarmament. The cooperation and assistance which all of you CD members and others, including in particular the members of the secretariat, have extended to me and to my delegation, has greatly facilitated our work and I thank you most sincerely and deeply for your positive disposition. Obviously, it had been my high hope that the various outstanding issues which the Conference had been tackling since the beginning of the first part of the 1995 session, would be resolved during my tenure. I must confess I had convinced myself that the CD would, before 9 June 1995, at least reach agreement on those issues in which I saw some heavy procedural content, like the establishment or re-establishment of negotiating mechanisms and expansion of membership of the Conference, so that substantive work could commence in various committees.

As it turned out, I was wrong - and very badly so - for we have not yet agreed on how to deal with some of the items on the agenda for this year, which makes the CD a really unique negotiating forum. I appeal to all delegations to seriously work towards the achievement of mutually agreeable solutions to these outstanding issues so that the Conference can concentrate on matters of real substance. We are, in fact, now half way through our

(The President)

current session and yet a lot of work still remains undone. The international community watches us as we sit here and will have very serious difficulty understanding that this forum, always attended - perhaps like no other international negotiating body - by very high-ranking government officials, mostly extraordinary and plenipotentiary envoys, is unable to start substantive work on the items on its agenda. As I said, the world is watching us and we must not be seen or understood to be negotiating mere words or language and/or group positions in Geneva. Our task is to do the real work of the CD's mandate in a flexible, progressive and determined fashion.

I therefore urge you once again, distinguished delegates and colleagues, to exercise judgement and common sense and to display the necessary political will and spirit of compromise in resolving your differences.

I wish my successor and incoming President, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, every success and pledge my delegation's fullest support and indeed my own willingness to cooperate with him and his delegation.

Muchas gracias and ahsante sana. Thank you very much for your attention.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.